Just a Matter of Time: The Second Circuit Renders Ancillary State Laws Inapplicable by Authorizing Arbitrators to Decide Whether a Statute of Limitations Caqn Bar Arbitration by Dambreville, Daivy P.E.
Arbitration Law Review
Volume 4 Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation Article 34
7-1-2012
Just a Matter of Time: The Second Circuit Renders
Ancillary State Laws Inapplicable by Authorizing
Arbitrators to Decide Whether a Statute of
Limitations Caqn Bar Arbitration
Daivy P.E. Dambreville
Follow this and additional works at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/arbitrationlawreview
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons
This Student Submission - Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn State Law eLibrary. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Arbitration Law Review by an authorized editor of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information, please contact ram6023@psu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daivy P. Dambreville, Just a Matter of Time: The Second Circuit Renders Ancillary State Laws Inapplicable by Authorizing Arbitrators to
Decide Whether a Statute of Limitations Caqn Bar Arbitration, 4 307 (2012).
307 
JUST A MATTER OF TIME: THE SECOND CIRCUIT RENDERS 
ANCILLARY STATE LAWS INAPPLICABLE BY AUTHORIZING 
ARBITRATORS TO DECIDE WHETHER A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
CAN BAR ARBITRATION 
 
Daivy P. E. Dambreville* 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
The U.S. Supreme Court has long adhered to a federal policy favoring arbitration, and 
has consistently resolved ambiguities within arbitration clauses in favor of arbitration.1 In 
applying this principle, courts are guided by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)2 which provides 
the federal substantive law of arbitrability.3 The Court has now consistently interpreted the 
FAA’s main purpose as to guarantee that arbitration agreements are enforced according to their 
terms.4 Yet, in regards to procedural matters of arbitrability there is a presumption that these 
matters should be decided by the court, unless otherwise stated in the arbitral agreement.5 But 
where parties devise broad reaching arbitration agreements, we have seen the court determine that 
the arbitrator, not the court, is better equipped to decide arbitrability.6 Likewise, where a choice-
of-law provision introduces ambiguity into the arbitration agreement, the court has determined 
that the arbitrator, and not the court, shall decide procedural arbitration matters.7 The court’s 
deference to arbitrators on matters concerning choice-of-law provisions in opposition to 
arbitration has traditionally been based on ambiguous language found within a given provision. 
                                                     
* Daivy P. E. Dambreville is an associate editor of the Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2013 Juris 
Doctor Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law. 
1 See Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Standard Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989) (“[D]ue regard 
must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself 
resolved in favor of arbitration.”). 
2 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006). 
3 See Bechtel Do Brasil Construções Ltda. v. UEG AraucÁria Ltda., 638 F.3d 150, 154 (2d Cir. 2011); see also 
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (“We are guided by the ‘federal 
substantive law of arbitrability’ created by the Federal Arbitration Act.”). 
4 See Volt, 489 U.S. at 479 (“The FAA’s primary purpose of ensuring that private agreements to arbitrate are 
enforced according to their terms.”); see also CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012) ("Section 2 of 
the FAA . . . requires that courts enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms."); see also Rent-A-Ctr., W., 
Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2777 (2010) (explaining that the FAA places arbitration agreements on the same level 
as other contracts and mandates that courts enforce the agreements in accordance to their terms). 
5 See First Options v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 939 (1995) (noting that if there is “clear and unmistakable” evidence 
that the parties intended the issue of arbitrability to be decided by the arbitrator then the issue is in the jurisdiction of 
the arbitrator). 
6 See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002); see also John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 
376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964) (“Thus, ‘procedural questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition’ 
are presumptively not for the judge, but for anaarbitrator, to decide.”). 
7 See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52, 62 (1995); see also Volt, 489 U.S. at 476 
(concluding that in light of the federal policy favoring arbitration, ambiguities relating to the scope of the agreement 
should be resolved in favor of arbitration).  
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This suggests that in circumstances where parties’ expressly, clearly, and specifically agree to 
have a particular law govern the arbitration procedure courts shall enforce the agreement, so long 
as it does not create ambiguity. Yet, courts have failed to provide guidance as to the level of 
clarity required to enforce an agreement whose provisions are opposition to arbitration. 
Part I of this article will focus on the Second Circuit’s recent expansion of the FAA, 
specifically its determination that ancillary state-laws governing procedural arbitration, including 
issues of timeliness, are preempted by the FAA.8 By analyzing the Second Circuit’s most recent 
decision in Bechtel v. UEGA, we will address the enhanced preemptive power of the FAA and 
shed light on serious concerns regarding the level of specific language required within the 
arbitration clause to ensure the enforcement of provisions written in opposition to arbitration. 
Part II focuses on the Supreme Court’s historical treatment of procedural arbitrability and 
illustrates its development from Volt Information Sciences9 to Mastrobuono and Howsam. 
Ultimately, the Court’s opinion in Howsam—which held that it is the arbitrator, and not the court, 
who rules on procedural issues such as whether a claim is time-barred—is shown to lead to a 
number of unresolved questions for the court. Part III examines the Second Circuit’s most recent 
handling of procedural arbitrability issues, such as time limitations, and the disabling effect that 
the Bechtel holding has had on ancillary state laws of arbitration procedure. By effectively 
rendering ancillary state laws on arbitration inapplicable, the FAA has essentially become the 
absolute preemptive procedural law of arbitration within the Second Circuit. Under this theory, 
parties are virtually unable to contractually assign issues of procedural arbitrability to the courts.   
Finally, I conclude that the Bechtel court correctly decided the issue and the subsequent 
effects will be beneficial to process of arbitration. The court’s decision will have the effect of 
providing predictability to future parties of arbitration; it will also accord greater jurisdiction of 
arbitration issues to arbitrators; and, it will maintain the FAA’s intended virtues of efficiency, 
cost effectiveness, and expeditiousness.  
II.  EVOLUTION OF PROCEDURAL ARBITRABILITY 
A. Desperate Times: The Growth and Application of Contract Freedom in 
Arbitration 
Section 2 of the FAA provides legal validity to the arbitral process and justifies 
agreements to arbitrate as lawful under the parties’ freedom of contract rights.10 In Volt 
Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees of Leland Standard Junior University, the Supreme 
Court first highlighted and emphasized the importance of contract freedom to the enforcement of 
                                                     
8 See Bechtel, 638 F.3d at 154. 
9 See Volt, 489 U.S. at 468. 
10 9 U.S.C. § 2 (“A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving 
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to 
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy 
arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”); see also Dean Witter v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 
221 (1985); see also Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp, 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1774–75 (2010). 
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arbitration contracts.11 The Volt court found that where the parties’ contractual intent was clearly 
to have state law govern the arbitration, the state law was capable of invalidating the agreement to 
arbitrate.12 The Court reasoned that section 4 of the FAA restricts the power of the courts by 
mandating them to compel arbitration, but must do so in the manner directed by the parties’ 
agreement.13 Pursuant to Volt, the parties are the masters of their arbitration agreement, and 
therefore they can decide which state laws will govern the arbitration process. Accordingly, we 
see the need for judicial oversight and interpretation in determining the parties’ contractual intent. 
The need for judicial inclusion when deciding threshold matters of arbitrability seems to work 
against the FAA’s essential benefits of efficient, expeditious, and inexpensive dispute resolution. 
Given these drawbacks, the Volt doctrine seems to have caustic limitations in practice.  
Consequently, subsequent cases have added qualifications and at times even contradicted the 
reasoning and decision in Volt.14  
The Court explained, with greater clarity, the role of contract freedom in arbitration in 
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan.15 In its decision, the Court declared the express 
language within the arbitration contract as the true source of final authority on matters of 
arbitrability.16 In sum, under Kaplan, the court only enforces the rules created and agreed upon by 
the parties on issues submitted for arbitration, in accordance to the terms of the arbitration 
agreement.17 In Kaplan, the arbitral contract’s choice of law provision only governed issues, 
whereas in Volt the state law seemed to govern all related arbitration disputes. Kaplan generally 
continues to be applied by the Court. And yet, where a doubt as to the scope of the arbitration 
contract arises, the Court has consistently resolved the issue in favor of arbitration.18 Again, the 
required inclusion of the judiciary in deciding the scope of arbitration seems to work in direct 
opposition of the essential benefits of the FAA.19   
                                                     
11 See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 233 
(Thomson/West 2007). 
12 See Volt, 489 U.S. at 479 (“Where, as here, the parties have agreed to abide by state rules of arbitration, 
enforcing those rules according to the terms of the agreement is fully consistent with the goals of the FAA, even if the 
result is that arbitration is stayed where the Act would otherwise permit it to go forward.”). 
13 See id. at 474–75 (“But § 4 of the FAA does not confer a right to compel arbitration of any dispute at any time; 
it confers only the right to obtain an order directing that ‘arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in [the 
parties’] agreement.’”) (emphasis added). 
14 See, e.g., Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 940–49. 
15 See id. at 938. 
16 See id. at 944 (“Courts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is ‘clea[r] 
and unmistakabl[e]’ evidence that they did so.”). 
17 See id. at 947. 
18 See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452 (2003); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 626–27 (1985) (explaining that we are beyond the time “when judicial suspicion of 
the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals” could restrict arbitration. The court found that 
it was required to “rigorously enforce” arbitration agreements). 
19 Benefits such as cost effectiveness, efficiency, and less time consuming. 
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B. Time for Change: The Mastrobuono Effect on Procedural Arbitration Law 
The subject of state law governing arbitrability was revisited and again redefined in the 
1995 Supreme Court decision of Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton.20 In Mastrobuono, 
the issue was “whether a choice-of-law provision may preclude an arbitration award of punitive 
damages that would otherwise be proper.”21 In other words, the question for the Court was 
whether the arbitral tribunal could award Mastrobuono punitive damages despite the agreed upon 
governing state law that prohibited arbitrators from awarding punitive damages.22 
The Court ruled in Mastrobuono that the state law could not preclude the arbitral tribunal 
from awarding punitive damages.23 The Court reasoned that neither the choice-of-law provision 
nor the arbitration award expressed an intention to prohibit the award of punitive damages, 
therefore the state law, at most, only introduced ambiguity into the arbitration agreement.24 Here, 
we see the court determine that the act of simply choosing a governing law by party does not 
express the parties’ intent to have a limiting rule enforced against arbitration.25 The Mastrobuono 
court further noted that based on the federal policy favoring of arbitration, if an arbitration 
agreement is ambiguous, the ambiguities must be resolved in support of arbitration.26 The 
manipulation and construction of the judicial line of reasoning in this case seems to suggest a 
motive by the court to compel and enforce arbitration by any available means. 
Moreover, despite its affirmation that the purpose of the implementation of the FAA was 
to enforce arbitration agreements as written,27 the Mastrobuono court again qualifies and, 
arguably, contradicts the doctrine in Volt by providing for a “party intent” evaluation. This 
evaluation takes into account what the parties would have reasonably intended to happen, as 
defined by the Court. This aspect of the decision is confusing and although Justice Stevens relied 
on language from Volt to sustain the Court’s interpretation of the FAA, he concludes that the case 
boils down to what the contract specifically says about punitive damages.28 In doing so, the court 
sets the specificity requirement of terms extremely high within the arbitration clause. In addition, 
the Mastrobuono court decides that contractual silence on a specific issue must be resolved in 
favor of arbitration.29 Hence, under this doctrine, the parties must be extremely specific as to the 
agreed upon limitations on arbitration and they must unambiguously state their intentions within 
the arbitration clause. 
In effect, the court suggests that, after Mastrobuono, the parties’ choice of state law will 
be enforced only when it supports the recourse to arbitration or when the parties have expressly 
recognized and agreed that the state law contains a restriction to the right to arbitrate that is 
applicable to their agreement.30 This approach to procedural arbitrability seems to almost always 
                                                     
20 See Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 52. 
21 See id. at 55. 
22 See id. 
23 See id. at 65. 
24 See id. at 62. 
25 See id. 
26 See id.; see also Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S at 24. 
27 See CARBONNEAU, supra note 11, at 233. 
28 See Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 58. 
29 See id. at 62. 
30 See CARBONNEAU, supra note 11, at 233. 
311 
inevitably resolve disputes in favor of arbitration. The Mastrobuono doctrine sets an unrealistic 
and unattainable standard for parties seeking procedural limitations on arbitration. Since it is very 
unlikely that parties could actually and accurately express the potentially infinite limitations to 
arbitration that they may intend to have enforced. This decision begs the question—how specific 
is specific enough? 
C. So Little Time: Howsam and the Timeliness Issue 
The issue of whether time limitations on arbitration are questions of arbitrability for the 
court to decide arose in Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds,31 a 2002 Supreme Court case.  In 
Howsam, the parties’ choice of law had a time limitation rule that prohibited the invocation of 
arbitration on claims brought more than six years from the dispute.32 The Court granted certiorari 
to the Tenth Circuit decision that held that the time limitation rule raised an issue about the 
dispute’s arbitrability, which should only be resolved by the court and not by the arbitrator.33  
As expected, the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit’s decision.34 Justice Breyer 
delivered the opinion for the Court, affirming that the time limitation rule raised a question of 
arbitrability, however he disagreed with the assertion that arbitrability questions were only for the 
court to decide.35 He explained that the question of arbitrability is for the court to decide where 
the parties have not clearly provided otherwise.36 We see here that parties can defer jurisdiction to 
the arbitrators on matters of arbitrability if they unambiguously state their intent within the 
arbitration clause.  
Yet, the Howsam court also determines that in general circumstances (for example, 
procedural questions growing out of the dispute) where parties would likely expect the arbitrator 
to decide the matter, presumptively the arbitrator, not the court, would decide the matter.37 
Interestingly, the court provides a carve-out to its rule by creating an exception based on party 
expectation. The court goes further by concluding that parties’ expect threshold matters of 
procedure to be decided by arbitrators.38 It is unclear how the court came to this conclusion, 
however it cites the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act of 2000 (RUAA), which states that an 
“arbitrator shall decide whether a condition precedent to arbitrability has been fulfilled,”39 as the 
basis for the exception.40  
The outcome of this decision has been that, after Howsam, procedural questions on 
gateway issues (e.g. time limitations) are presumed not to be for the court, but within the 
                                                     
31 Howsam, 537 U.S. at 79. 
32 Id. at 82. 
33 Id. 
34 See id. at 86. 
35 See id. 
36 See id. at 83 (quoting AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)) (“The 
question whether the parties have submitted a particular dispute to arbitration, i.e., the ‘question of arbitrability,’ is ‘an 
issue for judicial determination [u]nless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise.’”) (emphasis added). 
37 See id. at 84. 
38 See id.; see also Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S at 24–25 (“[T]he presumption is that the arbitrator should decide 
‘allegations of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.’”). 
39 RUAA § 6(c) cmt. 2, (2000). 
40 See Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85. 
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arbitrators’ jurisdiction.41 In other words, the court presumes that threshold issues of arbitration 
should be resolved by the arbitrator. Yet, this decision does not go so far as to expressly mandate 
procedural arbitrability jurisdiction to the arbitrator. The question still remains: whether parties 
can defer jurisdiction of procedural matters to the court when there is clear and unmistakable 
intent to do so, as stated in the arbitration clause. If the answer is yes, then how can parties 
actually accomplish this result? 
III.  BECHTEL’S  DECISION ON PROCEDURAL ARBITRABILITY AND ITS 
EFFECT ON ANCILLARY STATE LAWS 
A. Time Management: Bechtel Do Brasil Construções Ltda. v. UEG AraucÁria 
Ltda. 
The Second Circuit recently had the opportunity to test the limits of Howsam regarding 
time limitation rules that preclude arbitration, in Bechtel Do Brasil Construções Ltda. v. UEG 
AraucÁria Ltda.42 The issue in Bechtel involved the arbitrability of the statute of limitations 
defense. At issue were the conflicting terms contained in the arbitration clause. The agreement 
first states, “[a]ny dispute, controversy, or claim arising out of or relating to the Contract, or the 
breach, termination or validity thereof…shall be finally settled by arbitration,” 43 and also 
includes a choice-of-law provision that specified that the procedure and administration of 
arbitration would be governed by New York Civil Practice Law.44 Section 7502(b) of the New 
York Civil Practice Law states: 
If, at the time that a demand for arbitration was made or notice of 
intention to arbitrate was served, the claim sought to be arbitrated 
would have been barred by limitation of time had it been asserted in 
court of the state, a party may assert the limitation as a bar to the 
arbitration on an application to the court….45 
The District Court for the Southern District of New York found that the language of the 
contract showed “the parties’ clear intent to select New York law for arbitration procedure”, 
which includes limiting the arbitrators’ power to adjudicate preliminary questions of timeliness.46  
Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that, 
although the matter was a close one, the timeliness of a party’s claims is a question for the 
                                                     
41 See CARBONNEAU, supra note 11, at 274 (“Therefore, ‘procedural questions which grow out of the dispute and 
bear on its final disposition are presumptively not for the judge, but for an arbitrator to decide.’”). 
42 See Bechtel, 638 F.3d at 150. 
43 See id. at 154 (“Any dispute, controversy, or claim arising out of or relating to the Contract, or the breach, 
termination or validity thereof … shall be finally settled by arbitration in accordance with the Rules of Conciliation and 
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce … except as these rules may be modified herein.”) (emphasis 
added). 
44 See id. (“[T]he validity, effect, and interpretation of this agreement to arbitrate shall be governed by the laws of 
the State of New York,’ and ‘[t]he law governing the procedure and administration of any arbitration instituted 
pursuant to Clause 37 is the law of the State of New York.’”). 
45 See id. at 153. 
46 See id. 
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arbitrator, not the court.47 The rationale for the court’s decision was that, despite the contract’s 
language indicating New York law as governing the arbitral procedure, the contract does not 
specifically mention timeliness disputes or a right of parties to resort to the courts.48  
B. Running Out of Time: Bechtel’s Furtherance of the Judiciary’s Agenda on 
Arbitration 
As illustrated by the Mastorbuono, Howsam, and countless other decisions, the Supreme 
Court has shown an almost impervious desire to compel arbitration and defer to the competence 
of arbitrators to rule over parties’ claims. And to further these goals the Court seems to be less 
inclined to follow precedential reasoning for the sake of achieving a consistent end-result—
compelling arbitration. The Second Circuit’s holding in Bechtel befittingly abides by the Supreme 
Court’s precedents. In Bechtel, the court compelled arbitration despite the parties’ agreement to 
have arbitral procedures governed by a state-law—which explicitly permitted parties to assert 
statute of limitations grounds for barring arbitration on an application to the court.49  
Despite the terms of the chosen state-law, the Second Circuit held that the arbitrator 
should decide the statute of limitations issue. On its face, this decision seems to go against 
established precedent insofar as the court seems unwilling to enforce the express terms of parties’ 
agreement. However, the Bechtel court heavily relies upon the concept of specificity within 
contractual terms, as introduced and emphasized in Mastorbuono.50 The court required parties to 
explicitly show that the arbitration clause contained specific language that indicated an intention 
to have the state limitation rule enforced.51 And yet, the arbitration clause in Bechtel, seemingly, 
did contain the requisite language. The arbitration clause specifically named and declared the 
state law as “[t]he law governing the procedure and administration of … arbitration.”52 By 
agreeing to have New York law govern the arbitration procedure, it logically follows that the 
parties’ intended to be bound by New York’s law on arbitration procedure. Despite the parties’ 
expressed intent, the Bechtel court found that the issue of procedural arbitrability was not 
governed by state law.   
 Unfortunately, the question of whether parties can defer jurisdiction of procedural matters 
to the court remains unclear. The Bechtel court has not only presumed that the arbitrator has 
jurisdiction as prescribed by Howsam,53 but has, in effect, mandated jurisdiction to the arbitrator, 
in spite of the parties’ agreement. This ruling clearly illustrates the continued effort by the courts 
to defeat laws which serve as obstacles to arbitration. 
                                                     
47 See id. at 154. 
48 See id. at 156. 
49 See id. at 153.  
50 See Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 62 (noting that under the common-law parties can not benefit from the doubt 
created by ambiguous language within a contract; for the court to enforce language against the interest of the parties’ 
that drafted it, the contract must be unambiguous). 
51 See Bechtel, 638 F.3d at 155. 
52 See id. at 154. 
53 See Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85 (explaining that the condition precedent to arbitrability should be decided by the 
arbitrator). 
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1. The Court’s Effect on Ancillary State Laws to the Arbitration 
Agreement 
There are two possible explanations for the Bechtel court’s decision. One explanation is 
that the court has decided that rules in opposition to arbitration will only be enforced where 
parties’ specifically state the rule within the terms of the arbitration contract. This plausible 
explanation adheres to the Kaplan doctrine54 insofar as the arbitration clause is considered the 
final, and likely the only, authority on matters of arbitrability. Under this interpretation however, 
state laws on arbitration procedure that are ancillary to the agreement are only applicable where 
the court deems it appropriate. In other words, it is at the court’s discretion to apply ancillary state 
laws where they are found to favor to arbitration. This sort of pick-and-choose approach by the 
courts was first introduced by Mastrobuono,55 and it completely undermines the parties’ 
agreement and, consequentially, violates the parties’ freedom of contract rights. Courts are 
expected to provide the legal community with uniformity and predictability in their rulings, yet 
this approach accomplishes neither.  
Another explanation is that state laws on arbitration procedure are completely 
inapplicable and will not be adhered to or enforced by the court. Under this approach, parties are 
completely incapable of deferring issues of arbitrability to the court by way of state laws because 
the arbitration clause and the FAA are the only governing laws of procedure. Though the Bechtel 
court does not expressly state this as their approach, this seems to be the current position of the 
court. By rendering ancillary state laws on arbitration procedure inapplicable to the judiciary, the 
court has left parties incapable of choosing an alternative form of procedural law to govern 
arbitration. Following this line of reasoning, the Bechtel court expands the FAA’s reach and 
application in regards to issues of procedural arbitrability, because its’ decision effectively makes 
the FAA the absolute preemptive procedural law of arbitration in the Second Circuit.    
In effect, after Bechtel, parties are virtually unable to defer jurisdiction on issues of 
procedural arbitrability to the courts because of the unenforceability of ancillary state laws and 
highly impractical burden of stating every enforceable limiting rule within the arbitral clause.    
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Despite a contract clearly stating the parties’ intent to have a state law govern the 
arbitration procedure, the Second Circuit court will ultimately compel arbitration whether or not it 
violates state law. After Bechtel, if the arbitration agreement does not, itself, contain a clear 
statement in regards to the statute of limitations being withheld from the arbitrator, the FAA will 
defeat any ancillary state law on timeliness, notwithstanding an agreement to have the state law 
govern the procedure and administration of the arbitration. Without specifically expressing the 
disabling rule in the arbitral clause, the procedural arbitration issues will proceed to the arbitrator. 
Essentially, the Bechtel court expands Mastrobuono‘s ruling by determining that the FAA 
preempts ancillary state laws despite party intent. The Mastrobuono court sought to enforce what 
it thought the parties’ intended to convey within the arbitration contract, as to prevent a party 
                                                     
54 See Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 944. 
55 See CARBONNEAU, supra note 11, at 233 (“[A]fter Mastrobuono, party choice as to state law will be fully 
respected only when the choice-of-law fosters the recourse to arbitration….”). 
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from being penalized by an unfavorable rule. However, the Bechtel court compelled arbitration in 
accordance with the FAA despite the parties’ intent not to have the FAA apply. Although the 
Second Circuit’s decision can be criticized as not enforcing the terms stated within the arbitration 
agreement, the court has a very good reason for deciding in this fashion. 
In conclusion, the Second Circuit’s decision was correct because it provides predictability 
insofar as future parties to arbitration will not expect state laws on arbitral procedure—that are 
ancillary to the agreement—to be enforced. Second, this decision accords greater jurisdiction of 
arbitration matters to the arbitrator. As a result, courts will be alleviated from adjudicating on 
threshold procedural arbitrability issues that involve state laws. Lastly, the effect of the Bechtel 
decision is that the arbitration process will be more efficiency, less costly, and more expeditious; 
fulfilling the intended virtues of the FAA. 
